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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 
DIVISION OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES, 
Appellant, 
v. 
HUNTINGTON-CLEVELAND IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, a Utah non-profit corporation, 
Appellee. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. HUNTINGTON-CLEVELAND MISSTATES AND/OR MISREPRESENTS 
SEVERAL IMPORTANT FACTS 
In considering the appropriateness of the Motion to Dismiss granted by the trial court, 
Appellee Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Company (HCIC) must take the facts as Appellant 
Utah Division of Wildlife Resources (DWR) pleads them. A Motion to Dismiss is 
appropriate only where it "clearly appears that the plaintiff or plaintiffs . . . would not be 
entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any state of facts they could prove to support 
their claim." Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991; citations omitted). Yet, 
Appellee's brief misrepresents several important facts, adds facts that are not in the record, 
and mischaracterizes DWR's action. 
No. 20000413-SC 
Priority No. 15 
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For example, under "Nature of the Case" Appellee asserts that DWR brought this suit 
"seeking to invalidate historic amendments to its Articles of Incorporation which allowed for 
different voting rights and unequal assessments for classes of shareholders" (Brief of Appellee 
at 1). This is correct, so far as it goes. But DWR's First Amended Complaint (hereafter 
"Complaint") also seeks a declaration that, even if the documents were appropriately 
modified, their provisions have been inappropriately applied to DWR's stock shares. The 
difference, not at all subtle, goes to the heart of the matter before this Court. DWR's 
Complaint is not confined to an attempt to "invalidate" HCIC's corporate documents-it also 
challenges the implementation and applications of those documents. 
HCIC' s mischaracterization of DWR's action continues in the "Course of Proceedings" 
section of its brief where HCIC says: "DWR filed a complaint... that challenged the legality 
of amendments to [HCIC]'s Articles of Incorporation made in 1987 and adoption of Bylaws 
in January of 1995" (Brief of Appellee at 1). Again, this is correct, but it fails to mention that 
DWR's suit also challenges HCIC's treatment of DWR under the amendments and, more 
specifically, the characterization of DWR's water use under those amendments, the resulting 
assessment of DWR's stock shares, and the denial of DWR's voting rights. 
In the section entitled "Background Facts," which is not confined to the allegations in 
the Complaint, HCIC makes several self-serving statements concerning the history of both the 
1977 and 1987 changes to HCIC's corporate documents. Besides being unclear and 
unsupported by the Record, these allegations fail to mention that initially DWR was not in 
any way impacted by these changes. Before they were made, DWR irrigated and was treated 
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like other irrigators. While the changes were being made, DWR irrigated and was treated like 
other irrigators. After the changes were made, DWR irrigated and was treated like other 
irrigators. It was not until 1995, when the Bylaws were modified, that anything changed for 
DWR-and the changes occurred gradually from 1995 to 1999. 
In another portion of the "Background Facts" section, HCIC asserts that DWR "had 
actual knowledge in February of 1995 that a portion of its shares had been reclassified as 
M&I stock" that would be "subject to the longstanding voting right restrictions and higher 
assessments associated with such M&I stock" (Brief of Appellee at 6; emphasis supplied). 
HCIC goes on to assert that-after DWR protested-HCIC asked DWR to "self-evaluate" how 
its irrigation comported with the Bylaw definition change. Finally, HCIC asserts "[i]n 1999, 
[HCIC] determined after extensive discussions with DWR, that DWR did not meet the 
pecuniary gain requirement in the definition of 'irrigation use' and . . . classified all 4,530 
[DWR] shares as M&I stock." Id. at 7. 
This version of the facts is not based upon allegations in DWR's Complaint and is 
false. DWR's Complaint at f 40 alleges that at the 1995 shareholder meeting DWR 
representatives were "informed that they could no longer vote their non-agricultural shares 
at Company meetings for the election of Company officers. After [they] protested, they were 
told they could vote only if their vote did not influence an election's outcome." This 
paragraph simply alleges that those who attended the meeting were notified that a Bylaws 
change had occurred and, in DWR's case, that it had the potential to impact DWR shares. 
There is no allegation concerning reclassification of shares. At best the allegation 
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demonstrates uncertainty about reclassification by the time of the 1995 meeting, given that 
DWR was told initially it could not vote, but was later allowed to do so. At worst, it shows 
HCIC's intention to discriminate against DWR because, even though the reclassification had 
not yet occurred, DWR's voting rights were immediately questioned. At any rate, HCIC 
admits in its brief that "[i]n February, 1995, at the annual shareholder meeting, DWR was 
notified that some of its shares would be reclassified as 'M&F . . . and that such shares would 
be subject to the voting restrictions and higher assessments" (Brief of Appellee at 29; 
emphasis supplied), and that it was "in late 1995" when HCIC began assessing some of 
DWR's stock as M&I stock (Brief of Appellee at 6). Reclassification of DWR's shares did 
not take place until DWR received that assessment. 
HCIC's succeeding allegation-that after the initial classification of DWR's shares 
DWR was asked to "self evaluate" its share use in light of the 1995 Bylaw definition of 
irrigation to determine what portion of its irrigation met the definition-is absolutely false and 
completely misrepresents DWR's Complaint. DWR was never asked to conduct such an 
evaluation (if it had been, and if its self-determination had been respected, this suit would not 
have been filed) because DWR has always maintained that it is an irrigator and that none of 
its shares should be considered M&I shares. The Complaint alleges, for example, that "[n]one 
of the water delivered under DWR's HCIC stock is used for municipal or industrial purposes" 
(Complaint at f 29) md"from the initial receipt of an assessment containing '[M&I]' charges 
and prohibiting DWR from exercising full voting rights, DWR protested . . . and attempted 
to negotiate resolution based upon its assertion that HCIC's arbitrary and discriminatory 
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practices concerning assessments and voting rights were unfounded and illegal" (Complaint 
at 141; emphasis supplied). DWR also specifically alleges that HCIC, not DWR, determined 
which of DWR's shares did or did not qualify for irrigation assessment, and that the number 
has varied since 1995 (Complaint at %.46). 
HCIC also states, "There are a number of. . . shareholders whose stock has been 
classified as M&I. . . and who have been paying the higher . . . stock assessment... for 
decades" (Brief of Appellee at 8). The implication is that DWR is the only one of several 
similarly-situated shareholders to complain. But, the only other shareholders that apparently 
pay the M&I assessment are "a utility company and several municipalities" (R. 250). 
Presumably, assuming there is justification to charge M&I shareholders more than other 
shareholders, it would be municipalities and a power company that should pay the M&I rate. 
The most surprising representation in Appellee's "Background Facts" is based upon 
its own calculation of DWR's water use. Appellee states: 
Thus, the maximum amount of water that [DWR] can. . . beneficially use[] for 
traditional irrigation purposes is 1,774 acre feet (443 acres x 4 acre-feet per 
acre) if the acreage alleged in the Complaint is used (i.e., 93 acres at the 
Emery Game Farm and 350 acres at the Desert Lakes [sic] WMA). Under 
that scenario, and assuming that DWR usage meets the pecuniary gain 
requirement, all of DWR's stock would be classifiable as Irrigation stock, 
and this action would be moot 
(Brief of Appellee at 8; emphasis supplied). HCIC then repeats its mistaken assertion that 
such could not be the case because of the irrigated acreage "reported by DWR to Huntington-
Cleveland in 1996." Id The self-evaluation HCIC claims DWR made never took place, and 
DWR's Complaint does not allege it. Especially damning to Appellee, DWR specifically 
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alleges that the use of water delivered under HCIC shares to the Emery Game Farm and the 
Deseret Lake Wildlife Management Area is for irrigation purposes for pecuniary gain 
(Complaint at fflf 11-13, 23-24). DWR specifically asked the trial court to declare: 
DWR's water use to be an irrigation use, not subject to "[M&I]" assessment, 
and not subject to voting restrictions. 
In the alterative, this Court should view DWR's use of HCIC water to 
propagate wildlife hunted by DWR licensees, generating revenue upon which 
DWR depends, as irrigation with a pecuniary motive. This Court could 
declare that DWR's use of water is the "irrigation of crops for the purposes of 
pecuniary gain" under HCIC's Bylaws and not subject to "[M&I]" assessment 
or voting restrictions. 
(Complaint at ffif 63, 64). Thus, as HCIC suggests, this action should be moot because 
DWR's water uses meet the HCIC definition of "irrigation." 
II. HUNTINGTON-CLEVELAND CONTINUES TO MISCHARACTERIZE THE 
NATURE OF DWR'S LAWSUIT 
In its brief, HCIC continues to mischaracterize (or misunderstand) DWR's First 
Amended Complaint-just as the trial court did. This is done as though, by repetition, 
Appellee might change the Complaint into something other than what it is and confuse this 
Court into believing the Complaint questions only the modification of HCIC's corporate 
documents. DWR's Complaint, however, says what it says. It was purposefully drawn 
broadly to question the arbitrary and illegal 1977, 1987, and 1995 changes to the HCIC 
Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws 0/itfthe annual, targeted, and discriminatory application 
of those changes to DWR's stock shares after 1995. The Complaint seeks different types of 
relief in the alternative (declaratory, injunctive, damages, etc.) as the Court deems necessary 
to assure DWR is treated fairly-specifically that DWR is treated like other irrigators. DWR 
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pleads its water usage meets the Bylaw pecuniary gain definition and asks the Court to so 
declare (Complaint at ^ f 63). These allegations must be assumed to be true. Because they deal 
with ongoing, recurring, and future Bylaw implementation, no statute of limitations could 
have run with respect to them. 
Further, the trial court held: 
[DWR's] first amended complaint's claims are so broad and the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom so great, that if the Court is in error as to the 
applicability of the statutes of limitation herein, the plaintiffs should be 
allowed to flesh out their claims. 
(Memorandum Decision at 1; R. 262). Thus, the trial court specifically determined that 
DWR's claims state a cause of action, but for its erroneous statute-of-limitations ruling. Now 
HCIC asserts DWR's Complaint fails to state a claim for which a trial court could grant the 
requested relief. But, it is too late for HCIC to make this claim. If HCIC chose to question 
the trial court's finding that DWR's Complaint did state a cause of action but for the statute-
of-limitations questions, HCIC should have cross-appealed the trial court's decision. By 
failing to do so, HCIC accepted the determination for purposes of this appeal, and cannot 
raise that issue now. 
Also, this Court should remember that DWR's Complaint contains two causes of 
action for declaratory relief. The Utah Declaratory Judgment Act provides that: 
1. The district courts within their respective jurisdictions shall have 
power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further 
relief is or could be claimed The declaration may be either affirmative or 
negative in form and effect; and such declaration shall have the force and 
effect of a final... decree. 
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2. Any person [broadly defined] . , . whose rights, status or other 
legal relations are affected by a . . . contract. . . may have determined any 
question of construction or validity arising under the . . . contract. . . and 
obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relationships thereunder. 
3. A contract may be construed . . . before or after... a breach. 
5. The enumeration [in sections 2 and 3] does not limit or restrict 
the exercise of the general powers conferred [in section 1] in any proceeding 
where declaratory relief is sought, in which a judgment or decree will 
terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty. 
12. This Chapter is . . . to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to 
afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and 
other legal relations; and it is to be liberally construed and administered." 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1, -2, -3, -5, and -12 (1996). These provisions are important as 
background because the law with respect to DWR's causes of action for declaratory relief 
should be liberally construed and administered. 
ffl. DWR HAS CONSISTENTLY PLEADED AND ARGUED THAT HCIC'S 
MODIFICATION OF CORPORATE DOCUMENTS AND ITS 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE DOCUMENTS-SPECIFICALLY IN 
1999-WAS AND IS ILLEGAL 
The guts of HCIC's brief is that DWR, in its appeal, has "attempted] to argue a new, 
unpled theory-/, e., that [HCIC]'s alleged wrongful conduct was not the amendments to the 
Articles or adoption of the Bylaws, but instead was the annual assessments of shareholders" 
(Brief of Appellee at 13).1 This is particularly true, HCIC asserts, with respect to DWR's 
argument that reclassification of all DWR's shares as [M&I shares] in 1999 "created a 
separate and distinct cause of action which accrued just months before DWR filed its First 
1
 HCIC repeats some derivation of this argument throughout its brief (see Brief of 
Appellee at 1, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 19, 20, 22, 25-36). 
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Amended Complaint" (Id. at 26).2 HCIC's allegation that DWR did not plead this cause of 
action in its Complaint is false-DWR pleaded it in its Complaint, covered it in its brief on 
HCIC's Motion to Dismiss below, and mentioned it in oral arguments before the trial court. 
A response to HCIC's mistaken assertion should be considered against the backdrop 
of Utah's notice pleading law. This Court has held: 
[U]nder Utah's liberal notice pleading requirements, all that is required is that 
the pleadings "be sufficient to give 'fair notice of the nature and basis of the 
claim asserted and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" 
Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Utah 1986). 
Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah 1998). 
HCIC asserts DWR's Complaint fails to allege that HCIC's assessment of DWR's 
shares was illegal. Yet, the Complaint (referring to 1995-1999) says DWR "was prevented 
from exercising full voting rights, while being required to pay . . . '[M&I]' assessments" 
(Complaint at ^  41; emphasis supplied). And that, "[fjrom time to time, HCIC representatives 
have threatened to cut off water delivery to DWR if it did not pay its full assessments at the 
higher' [M&I]' rates" (Id. at % 42; emphasis supplied). This alleges harm DWR suffered from 
2
 But HCIC cannot seem to get straight whether or not DWR questioned the 
legality of the assessment process in its Complaint. On p. 26, HCIC makes the just-
quoted statement. On p. 20, HCIC says: "Indeed, DWR is not only seeking to recover 
alleged 'illegal' assessments, but is also seeking to reestablish voting rights which are 
also defined according to the use of water . . . . DWR attempts to ' sneak' these claims in 
behind a claim for reimbursement of 'illegal' assessments. However, DWR has no legal 
entitlement to the alleged 'illegal' assessments unless and until a court of law determines 
that they are in fact illegal. Such a determination of illegality is barred by section 78-12-
25(1)" (Brief of Appellee at 20 n. 10). HCIC cannot have it both ways. Of course, as 
explained herein, DWR's Complaint contains several assertions that the assessment 
process was erroneous, improper, and illegal. 
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the assessment process. The Complaint also describes the scenario by which HCIC 
determined which of DWR's shares would be subject to the M&I surcharge (Id at % 46). It 
then alleges HCIC determined in 1999 that "none of DWR's water use qualified as 'irrigation 
use'" (Id at % 47). It indicates that DWR paid the M&I portion of the 1995-1998 assessments 
under protest (Id at f 48), and that, when the Complaint was filed, DWR had paid the 1999 
assessment "less the '[M&I]' portion of that assessment (Id.; emphasis supplied).3 The 
Complaint also asserts that in collecting assessments: 
HCIC continues to discriminate against DWR as an HCIC shareholder and 
indeed has 'stepped up'the discrimination by requiring '[M&I]' assessments 
on all of DWR's shares and by denying DWR any voice in the election of 
Company officials, notwithstanding that all DWR use of HCIC water is for 
beneficial irrigation purposes, not for [M&I] purposes. 
(Complaint at 1f 50; emphasis supplied). 
The Complaint's First Cause of Action says, "[assessments on stock shares of a 
mutual non-profit water company must equitably reflect water delivery costs. In DWR's case, 
the higher' [M&I]' assessment does not reasonably, or ' equitably,' reflect any increased costs 
of water delivery" (Complaint at % 56; emphasis supplied). DWR also alleges it costs no more 
for HCIC to deliver water to DWR under its HCIC shares than to other irrigators (Id at 1ft[l0, 
21). DWR further asserts: 
By artificially defining some of DWR's irrigation for wildlife propagation as 
a '[M&I]' water use, [HCIC] has singled out DWR, a minority shareholder, 
for illegal, inequitable, and discriminatory treatment. This court should 
3
 Since the Complaint was filed, DWR has paid the M&I portion of the 1999 
assessment and the entire 2000 assessment-under protest. 
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declare that the HCIC actions are an arbitrary and capricious violation of 
DWR's property rights and its rights as an HCIC shareholder." 
(Complaint at % 59). Obviously, the reference to "defining some of DWR's irrigation... as 
a '[M&I]' water use" pertains to the assessment process. The First Cause of Action also 
requests "th[e] Court... [to] declare the 1987 change to the Articles of Incorporation and the 
1995 Bylaw modification void to the extent they require assessment of DWR's HCIC stock 
shares as used for '[M&I]'purposes and deny DWR its full voting rights in the Company" 
(Complaint at \ 60; emphasis supplied). 
DWR's Second Cause of Action, for "Declaratory Relief," reasserts that all DWR use 
of water is for irrigation, and requests the Court to "declare DWR's water use to be an 
irrigation use, not subject to C[M&I]' assessment, and not subject to voting restrictions" 
(Complaint at ^ f 63; emphasis supplied). Such a declaration may or may not involve a finding 
that the 1995 Bylaw definition of irrigation, for example, was inappropriate or illegal, perse. 
DWR also requested that the "[C]ourt should view DWR's use of HCIC water to propagate 
wildlife hunted by DWR licensees, generating revenue upon which DWR depends, as 
irrigation with a pecuniary motive" (Id. at ^  64). In the alternative, the Complaint requests the 
Court to declare "that DWR's use of water is the 'irrigation of crops for the purpose of 
pecuniary gain' under HCIC's Bylaws and not subject to '[M&I]' assessment or voting 
restrictions" (Id.; emphasis supplied). In other words, if the Bylaw definition survives 
scrutiny, the Court should declare that DWR's use of water for the beneficial irrigation of 
crops for pecuniary gain fits within the Bylaw definition. 
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HCIC arbitrarily determined that DWR's use of water did not comply with the Bylaw 
definition several times-including once just weeks before the Complaint was filed. HCIC 
ultimately determined that none of DWR's irrigation met the definition (after previously 
finding that much of DWR's irrigation met the definition). How could any statute of 
limitations possibly have run with respect to this claim, when the alleged harm occurred just 
weeks before the Complaint was filed? DWR's alternative request for declaratory relief is, in 
effect, to declare that DWR's irrigation meets the Bylaw definition-at least to the same extent 
as other irrigators. What could be more clear in terms of a request for relief seeking to remedy 
recent, recurring harm from an illegal assessment process? 
In its Fifth Cause of Action, labeled "Injunctive Relief," DWR asserts that the 
modifications of HCIC s corporate documents were illegal and alleges that: 
In the past, HCIC threatened to cut off DWR's water if the improper '[M&I]' 
assessments were not paid. DWR has refused to pay the illegal 1999 ' [M&I]' 
assessment on its HCIC shares. Based on past experience, DWR faces the 
immediate threat of irreparable harm from having water delivery to its irrigated 
lands cut off for failure to pay the illegal assessment. 
(Complaint at \ 82; emphasis supplied). DWR then requests from the Court an injunction 
requiring HCIC to deliver to DWR its irrigation water for the 1999 irrigation 
season based on DWR's payment of its 1999 assessment, without paying the 
'[M&I]' portion of the assessment. Further, the injunction should prohibit 
HCIC from taking any action against DWR, such as selling DWR's HCIC 
stock shares, as a result of DWR's failure to pay the illegal '[M&I]' 
assessment 
(Id. at If 83; emphasis supplied). DWR also requests the Court to "enjoin HCIC from taking 
further improper actions to discriminate against minority shareholders, specifically DWR, with 
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respect to fundamental shareholder rights, such as voting . . . and establishing unjust 
assessments" (Id.; emphasis supplied). 
The notion that DWR's First Amended Complaint did not seek redress of the harm 
caused by the assessment process-particularly the 1999 assessment-is ludicrous. DWR's 
Complaint pleads: (1) HCIC's 1995-1999 assessments of DWR's stock shares were 
inappropriate and illegal; (2) each such assessment gave rise to a separate cause of action for 
which damages are sought; and (3) no statute of limitations could have run with respect to any 
assessment because each occurred within four years before DWR filed its suit. 
In its Response to HCIC's Motion to Dismiss, DWR said: 
DWR adds a note of caution here with respect to its compliance with the 
HCIC Bylaw definition, which it has pled in the alternative (see First Amended 
Complaint ffif 12, 13, 23, 24, 60, 64; Prayer for Relief^ 3). DWR believes it 
meets the definition; and that there is as much "pecuniary gain" in its irrigation 
as there is in the irrigation of many of its neighbors who hold HCIC stock. 
However, DWR believes the issues raised in its Complaint run much deeper than 
whether DWR irrigates for pecuniary gain. There are important policy 
implications if HCIC' is allowed to proceed with its discriminatory actions 
because the HCIC Articles of Incorporation and Bylaw changes are illegal. As 
they apply to DWR they are arbitrary and capricious, confiscatory and without 
any reasonable basis. Thus, while there is little question HCIC has failed to 
address DWR's factual allegations that it irrigates for pecuniary gain, this should 
not be the sole focus of future proceedings in this case. Rather, the impact of 
implementation of the 1995 Bylaws with respect to DWR should receive equal 
focus. 
(Response to Motion to Dismiss at 12; R. 244). 
In oral argument on the Motion, the following interchange occurred: 
THE COURT: The point that you make relative to a statute of 
limitations for declaratory relief on the third, fourth and fifth categories, are you 
saying there is a separate and distinct statute of limitations for declaratory relief 
versus tortuous action .. . and/or improper corporate action . . . ? 
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MR. JOHNSON: Let me see if I can put it another way and try to 
answer your question What I'm saying with respect to declaratory relief 
is that our main objective is to prevent the harm. The harm is so recent that no 
statute of limitations could have run to prevent us from acting to keep the harm 
from occurring in the future. 
Fm not sure how we got the point of misunderstanding in our pleadings 
that somehow [it appears] our only interest is to modify the bylaws and/or the 
articles of incorporation, because we tried to make clear in our complaint that 
that could be a possible outcome, and certainly that could be what the Court 
would might decide to do. 
But another possible outcome is to leave the articles and the bylaws just 
the way they are and simply not have them apply to the Division of Wildlife 
Resources because it's an irrigator, and in this regard the harm then clearly is 
being required to pay the assessment... which is nearly twice as much as we 
would pay if we weren't being assessed as M&I users and not being able to vote. 
(R. 282: 42-43). 
In sum, DWR's Complaint pleaded that implementation of the modified HCIC 
corporate documents created causes of action and DWR contended as much in both written 
and oral arguments to the trial court. In response, the court held: 
[DWR's] first amended complaint's claims are so broad and the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom so great, that if the Court is in error as to the 
applicability of the statutes of limitations herein, the plaintiffs should be 
allowed to flesh out their claims. 
(Memorandum Decision at 1; R. 262). 
IV. MUTUAL IRRIGATION COMPANY ANNUAL STOCK ASSESSMENTS ARE 
"CHARGES" AS UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25(1) USES THE TERM 
DWR has consistently pleaded and argued that modification of the HCIC corporate 
documents in 1977, 1987, and 1995 created causes of action for DWR against HCIC as did 
annual implementation of the changes contained in those documents from 1995 through 1999 
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(and, indeed, to the present time). HCIC denies this and asserts that even if it is the case two 
statutes of limitations, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-25(1) and 78-12-26(4), prohibit DWRfrom 
pursuing its claims. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1) says: 
An action may be brought within four years: 
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in 
writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for 
any article charged on a store account; also on an open account for work, labor 
or services rendered, or materials furnished; provided, that action in all of the 
foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within four years after the last 
charge is made or the last payment is received[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1) (1996). HCIC asserts this statute applies to DWR's action-
except that the last twelve words should be ignored because, despite the statute's wording and 
grammar, they apply only to "open accounts." One searches HCIC's brief in vain for a legal 
or logical basis for this conclusion. 
DWR's challenge to HCIC's implementation of its corporate documents is not a "new, 
unpled theory." In our primary brief, we cite case law holding that when a contract is 
implemented over a period of time, each inappropriate charge or payment creates a new cause 
of action. Here, each inappropriate assessment created a new cause of action. It may be that 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1) (1996) "cuts off the number of years a shareholder challenging 
illegal assessments can go "back in time" to recover overpayments. No such "cut off applies 
in this instance, however, because-as HCIC admits-HCIC requested payment of all 
assessments in question within the four-year period before DWR filed its suit and since 
DWR's Complaint requests declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent future harm. 
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V. DWR COULD NOT HAVE CHALLENGED HCIC'S ACTIONS UNTIL DWR 
RECEIVED ITS FIRST ASSESSMENT UNDER THE 1995 BY-LAWS 
DWR could not have challenged the 1995 HCIC Bylaw changes until after they were 
applied to DWR's stock shares because the nature of the harm caused DWR could not have 
been known until HCIC reclassified DWR's shares using the new Bylaw definition. As HCIC 
admits, the term "M&I" in the HCIC Bylaws "does not refer to '[M&I]' as commonly 
understood" (Brief of Appellee at 27 n. 17). Any challenge DWR may have attempted to make 
before the reclassification would not have been ripe for judicial resolution. 
In this regard, HCIC's brief is internally inconsistent-just as its treatment of DWR has 
been inconsistent. In some places HCIC asserts reclassification of DWR's shares occurred for 
voting purposes before or during the February 1995 shareholder meeting. For example, HCIC 
says: 
DWR had actual knowledge in February of 1995 that a portion of its shares 
had been reclassified as M&I stock and that DWR would thereafter be subject 
to the longstanding voting right restrictions and higher assessments associated 
with such M&I stock. 
(Brief of Appellee at 6; emphasis supplied). Later, however, HCIC says: 
In February, 1995, at the annual stockholder meeting, DWR was notified that 
some of its shares would be reclassified as "[M&I]" as the terms had been 
more clearly defined and that such shares would be subject to the voting 
restrictions and higher assessments. 
(Brief of Appellee at 29; emphasis supplied). And HCIC admits: "[HCIC] began assessing 
aportion of DWR9s stock as M&I stock in late 1995 in accordance with the definition in the 
new Bylaws" (Brief of Appellee at 6). The first quote, indicating DWR's shares had been 
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reclassified by the February 1995 meeting, does not reflect DWR's Complaint and is false.4 
The second two statements are correct and reflect the facts in DWR' s Complaint. DWR was 
informed at the 1995 shareholder meeting that a Bylaw change had occurred which had the 
potential to impact DWR's shares. The initial reclassification took place in "late 1995" when 
DWR received its first assessment under the new Bylaws. 
HCIC cites Aurora Credit Services v. Liberty West Dev.f Inc., 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 
1998), and United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880 (Utah 1993), 
for the proposition that when a shareholder challenges the validity of a corporate act, the 
statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff has sufficient information to be put on 
notice to inquire further if there are questions about the corporation's conduct. Neither^li/rara 
Credit nor United Park City Mines are of any help to HCIC in this case, however. Their facts 
are distinguishable from the instant matter and their holdings inapplicable. First, both involve 
situations where plaintiffs maintained there were questions about their knowledge of when 
certain events occurred, along with allegations that defendants made efforts to conceal 
important facts. Neither is the case here. DWR admits it had tacit knowledge of HCIC's 
Bylaw change at the February 1995 shareholder meeting. It also admits it understood the 
change had the potential to impact DWR's voting of its HCIC shares. But DWR has always 
maintained that it is an irrigator and the change did not impact its shares. It was not until 
4
 Assuming, arguendo, DWR's shares had been reclassified by the 1995 
shareholder meeting, DWR's harm was only with respect to voting-not assessment of its 
shares. These are two separate types of harm, and DWR has separate causes of action for 
each. HCIC admits that all assessment of DWR's shares at the M&I rate occurred within 
the four-year period prior to when DWR filed its Complaint. 
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DWR received its first assessment under the new Bylaws that it could bring suit to question 
their impact, particularly with respect to the financial harm caused by the higher M&I 
assessment. 
Second, both Aurora Credit and United Park City Mines involve a "one-time event": 
inAurora, the sale of a corporation's major asset; in United Park City Mines, the restructuring 
of corporate assets and debt Here, DWR complains of a series of ongoing events beginning 
in 1977 and continuing to 1999-particularly the assessment process starting in 1995. 
While HCIC places great weight on the statement "the statute of limitations on a cause 
of action begins to run when the plaintiff has sufficient information to put him or her on notice 
to inquire further if he or she has questions about the defendant's conduct," both Aurora and 
United Park City Mines temper this simple rule with layers of complexity. In Aurora, this 
Court found that the rule concerning when statutes of limitations begin to run is subjective-not 
objective. This Court described the question as whether "a reasonable person would have 
researched the property's title record." 970 P.2d at 1278-79. And, in United Park City Mines, 
this Court stated that "[a]s a general rule, the statute begins to run upon the happening of the 
last event necessary to complete the cause of action." 870 P.2d at 890, quoting Becton 
Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983). 
Here, the last event necessary to complete DWR's cause of action was HCIC's 
reclassification of DWR's shares under the new Bylaws, which occurred in "late 1995"-
within the four-year period before DWR filed its suit. And, since that first assessment was 
received, HCIC has issued DWR inappropriate and illegal assessments in 1996, 1997, 1998, 
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and 1999-all of which were called into question by DWR's Complaint. DWR's claims were 
not ripe until its shares were reclassified and it was first harmed by HCIC's actions. Further, 
each inappropriate assessment issued thereafter created a new cause of action, for which a new 
statute of limitations began to run. Each of these causes of action of necessity calls into 
question the corporate documents upon which the assessment was based. Further, the harm 
alleged has continued since the Complaint was filed, and will continue into the future with 
each annual assessment that is inappropriate and with each denial of voting rights. 
VI. DWR'S THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-12-26(4) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(4) (1996) provides that "[a]n action may be brought within 
three years . . . for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other than for a penalty or 
forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where in special cases a different limitation is 
prescribed by the statutes of the state." DWR's Third Cause of Action seeks a declaration that 
the amendment of HCIC's corporate documents violated Utah Code Ann. § 16-4-24 (1995), 
where the legislature provided that irrigation companies organized before 1933 when the law 
was passed may charge other than pro rata stock assessments only when their articles of 
incorporation in place at that time "expressly" so permit. The HCIC Articles of Incorporation 
in place in 1933 did not meet this standard, and HCIC's attempts thereafter to amend its 
Articles to allow for other than pro rata assessment violate the statute. HCIC makes no real 
effort to refiite this claim, except to: (1) reiterate its incorrect assertion that the only acts DWR 
complains of are the 1977 and 1987 modification of the HCIC Articles of Incorporation and 
the 1995 Bylaw changes; (2) claim that DWR can point to no case law "which defines the 
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word 'liability' in § 78-12-26(4) as meaning exclusively 'financial liability'"; and (3) point out 
that while DWR's Third Cause of Action is for declaratory relief only, its "Sixth Cause of 
Action seeks money damages for over payment of [M&I] stock assessments-a financial 
liability."5 
HCIC's approach is wrong. First, the initial assumption concerning the nature of 
DWR's action is blatantly incorrect-and HCIC admits as much in its comments concerning 
the damages DWR seeks. Second, the trial court and HCIC read § 78-12-26(4) in the most 
tortured fashion possible. The statute requires an action to be brought within three years "for 
a liability created by the statutes of th[e] state." DWR's Third Cause of Action does not 
involve a liability created by state statute-it seeks a declaration that "HCIC's purported 
amendment of its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws in 1977,1987, and 1995 to provide for 
assessment of shares on other than a pro rata basis . . . violates Utah's statutes on assessment 
of corporate shares and, as such, should be declared void" (Complaint at f 70). Third, while 
HCIC maintains that DWR cites no authority that the word "liability" in § 78-12-26(4) means 
exclusively "financial liability," HCIC cites no authority at all concerning § 78-12-26(4). 
DWR cites several cases in its initial brief to demonstrate that the section does, indeed, refer 
only to matters of financial liability created by state statute. 
Perhaps HCIC gives short shrift to the application of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(4) to 
DWR's Third Cause of Action because it is convinced that it doesn't really matter whether the 
trial court properly applied it or not, given that DWR's "claim would fall under th[e] catch-all 
5
 This is yet another example of HCIC's tacit admittance that DWR's Complaint is 
not confined to a challenge of the amendment of HCIC's corporate documents only. 
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provision of 78-12-25(3) (1996)" [a four-year statute of limitations]. (Brief of Appellee at 25). 
The problem with this, of course, is that the trial court specifically held that § 78-12-26(4) 
precluded DWR's Third Cause of Action-not § 78-12-25(3). 
Vn. A NEW CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE IN 1999 WHEN HCIC RECLASSIFIED 
ALL OF DWR'S SHARES AS MUNICIPAL AND INDUSTRIAL SHARES, AND 
DWR ALLEGED THIS CAUSE OF ACTION IN ITS COMPLAINT 
As demonstrated in painstaking detail earlier in this document, the Complaint 
challenges the modification of HCIC'S corporate documents from 1977 to 1995, and the 
implementation of those amended documents to DWR's HCIC shares from October 1995 to 
1999 when the Complaint was filed. The Complaint's Prayer for Relief is crucial. Despite 
what HCIC claims concerning the relief DWR seeks, the Prayer for Relief states: 
1. Declare that HCIC's actions requiring DWR to pay "[M&I]" assessments 
for any of its irrigation use and denying DWR voting rights on certain shares 
are illegal and of no force or effect. 
2. Declare . . . that the 1977 and 1987 amendments to HCIC's Articles of 
Incorporation and the 1995 amendment to HCIC's Bylaws are void and of no 
force or effect to the extent they deny DWR's voting rights or increase its cost 
of receiving HCIC-delivered water to an amount per share greater than that 
paid by other HCIC agricultural irrigators. 
3. Declare . . . . that DWR's water use qualifies as an "irrigation use" under 
HCIC's Bylaws and thus is only susceptible to agricultural assessment, with 
full voting rights. 
4. Enjoin HCIC from refusing to deliver DWR's water under HCIC shares 
because DWR has not paid the illegal assessment levied against those shares 
by HCIC for 1999, and from taking further discriminatory actions harming 
DWR's HCIC assessments or voting rights. 
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It is hard to imagine what more DWR would have to plead to give "fair notice" of its 
intent to contest the legality of the modification of HCIC's corporate documents and of the 
implementation of those documents through the assessment process. 
HCIC asserts that Workman v. Brighton, Inc., 1999 UT 30, 976 P.2d 1209, 
demonstrates DWRhas no separate cause of action for HCIC's 1999 reclassification of DWR 
stock. To the contrary, Workman says: (1) shareholders in a mutual non-profit company have 
a cause of action to challenge illegal share assessments, although Workman's attempt failed 
on the merits; and (2) Workman's challenge would have succeeded had he been able to show 
an "overriding inequity" in his treatment by the corporation, or that corporate officers had 
"abused their authority or otherwise systematically used the power of assessment to 
disproportionately benefit a specific group of [shareholders] to the long-term detriment of the 
rest." 1999 UT 30, f 15. The 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 assessments each created a new 
cause of action. In 1999 when HCIC "raised the stakes" by disregarding past assessment 
practice and requiring DWR to pay M&I rates on all DWR shares, the controversy became 
acute because of the "overriding inequity" of HCIC's actions, which disproportionately 
benefitted "traditional" farmers to DWR's "long-term detriment" because the assessments 
would continue indefinitely. 
The fact patterns in Workman and this case are fundamentally different. Brighton 
Properties treated Workman just like all of the other shareholders in the non-profit 
corporation, but Workman complained that he should be treated differently. To the contrary, 
HCIC treats DWR differently than other shareholders. HCIC tries to say, in effect, "but 
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we treat DWR the same as the cities and the Power Company-DWR cannot complain." The 
problem, of course, is DWR is neither a municipality nor an industry, nor does it use any water 
for M&I purposes. Assuming there is justification for HCIC to assess those entities more than 
irrigators-such as, for example, that they take water delivery year-round instead of only during 
the irrigation season-DWR does not fall into that category. DWR takes and uses its water just 
as the other irrigators do. It costs HCIC no more to deliver water to DWR than to other 
shareholders. Yet, the arbitrary definition of "irrigation" (apparently tailor-made to exact a 
subsidy from DWR) incorrectly categorizes DWR as an M&I user. HCIC refers to this as 
"reasonable" (Brief of Appellee at 30)-which is may be true for those receiving the subsidy. 
But, to an irrigation stockholder who simply wants fairness, it is not "reasonable." And 
Workman doesn't help HCIC unless HCIC requires all shareholders to be assessed equally.6 
To support its argument that anew cause of action did not arise in 1999, HCIC repeats 
its hackneyed assertions that "such a cause of action was not raised in DWR's... Complaint"; 
that the claim is "entirely new" to HCIC; and that DWR cannot raise the claim for the first 
time on appeal. DWR is at a loss to see how HCIC could have read the Complaint and missed 
these assertions. 
6
 While this Court's opinion is not completely clear on this point-the relevant 
corporate documents in Workman (the articles of incorporation and Workman's purchase 
agreement) appear to have been written in 1974 and 1986, respectively. The assessment 
Workman complained of did not occur until 1996, and was based on implementation of 
the 1974 articles of incorporation. For all of the wrangling between Workman and 
Brighton, neither Brighton nor this Court believed Workman was precluded by a statute 
of limitations from bringing his action against the company because of the passage of 
time between when the articles of incorporation were approved and when they were 
interpreted to harm Workman. 
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VIII. DWR'S POSITION ON THE MERITS OF THIS CASE IS STRONG, BUT 
THE MERITS ARE NOT CURRENTLY BEFORE THE COURT 
HCIC asserts DWR has no right to challenge assessments or voting restrictions "where 
the [HCIC] corporate governance documents specifically allow for the same," that with the 
"benefits of unified [corporate] action... comes the sacrifice of individual autonomy," and 
when a corporation "makes a legitimate, reasonable business decision, . . . minority 
shareholders should not be entitled to challenge [it]" (Brief of Appellee at 32). 
This assertion is misguided. First, the trial court held that, but for the statute of 
limitations, DWR "should be allowed to flesh out [its] claims" (Memorandum Decision at 1; 
R. 262). Second, HCIC did not appeal this ruling. Third, this contention goes to the merits 
of this case-which are not currently before this Court. DWR will not, at this juncture, debate 
the merits of its case which are not currently at issue. 
This Court has said that by purchasing mutual non-profit irrigation company shares, a 
shareholder gains, "the right to receive a proportionate share of the water distributed by [the 
company] . . . in the same manner as all other shareholders." East Jordan Irrigation Co. v. 
Morgan, 860 P.2d 310, 314 (Utah 1993; citation omitted). It has also said, "[assuming a 
[mutual irrigation company] . . . has violated any enforceable obligations it owes to its 
shareholders with respect to manner, mode, or quantity of [water] delivery, then those 
shareholders possess a cause of action . . . . " Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 
750 (Utah 1996). Because of HCIC's voting and assessment practices, DWR does not receive 
its proportionate share of HCIC water in the same manner as other HCIC irrigators. DWR 
simply wants to be treated the same as other irrigators. It did not give up that right when it 
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acquired HCIC stock. HCIC's assertion that its treatment of DWR results from a "legitimate, 
reasonable business decision" severely begs the question of fairness, and engenders questions 
about the propriety of HCIC making business decisions in a non-profit setting.7 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should overrule the trial court, and reinstate DWR's Complaint in its 
entirety. 
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7
 Assuming the merits are reached, DWR will argue, among other things, that the 
principles from this Court's holding in Piatt v. Town ofTorrey, 949 P.2d 325 (Utah 
1997), apply in the mutual non-profit irrigation company setting. DWR pleaded in its 
Complaint that the HCIC's assessment must be "based upon the costs of delivering 
water" (Complaint at If 57), and argued this concept in its Response to HCIC's Motion to 
Dismiss (Response to Motion to Dismiss at 4) and in oral argument on the Motion (R. 
282; 52-53). 
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